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The Dispositionalist Deity: How God Creates Laws and Why Theists Should Care 
How does God govern the world? For many theists ‘laws of nature’ play a vital role. But 
what are these laws, metaphysically speaking? I shall argue that laws of nature are not 
external to the objects they govern, but instead should be thought of as reducible to 
internal features of properties. Recent work in metaphysics and philosophy of science 
has revived a dispositionalist conception of nature, according to which nature is not 
passive, but active and dynamic. Disposition theorists see particulars as being internally 
powerful rather than being governed by external laws of nature, making external laws in 
effect ontologically otiose. I will argue that theists should prefer a dispositionalist 
ontology, since it leads them towards the theory of concurrentism in divine conservation, 
rather than occasionalism, and revives the distinction between internal and external 
teleology. God on this view does not govern the world through external laws of nature, 
but rather through internal aspects of powerful properties.  
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The Dispositionalist Deity: How God Creates Laws and Why Theists Should Care 
Most people who talk about God do not talk about him ‘in any coherent sense at all’, 
laments David Bentley Hart (2013, 1). Whilst Stephen Mumford complains, ‘I had heard 
many people discuss the laws of nature and I had seen what some of them purported to 
be. But I confess to finding laws somewhat puzzling existents.’ (2013, 15) Combining 
these misunderstood and complex topics therefore, is no short and simple matter. 
Consequently, I shall not examine what ‘God’ means; rather commend an increasingly 
popular conception of laws of nature and provide reasons why theists might adopt this 
account. It should be noted from the outset that I will not be concerned with laws of 
science, ‘those regularities of the natural world which are known to us and which have 
been cast in appropriate symbolic forms.’ (Weinert, 1995, 5) Rather, I will be addressing 
the ontological sense of laws of nature, with any subsequent use of ‘law’, unless 
otherwise stated, referring to natural physical laws. Mumford asks, ‘what in the world is a 
law?’ (2004, xii) I will seek to answer this question presently and then proceed to 
explicate dispositionalism. Following this, I will provide two reasons why theists might 
adopt such a view, in light of its recovery of concurrentism and internal teleology, and 
conclude by rebutting a potential objection. This paper will therefore be initially 
concerned with areas related to philosophy of science and metaphysics and then, having 
set the stage, will delve into matters of philosophy of religion. 
What are Laws of Nature? 
Scientists routinely tell us that things obey, are constrained, and determined by laws of 
nature, but far less frequently express what these laws metaphysically are. Ancient Greek 
and medieval philosophy did not conceive of laws of nature as we do, which is clear 
from both Aristotle (Johnson, 2005, 60, n47) and Aquinas (Adams, 2013, 3-13; Harrison, 
2008, 14-15), and yet still thought of the cosmos as orderly and regular. It is in the 
mechanistic philosophy of Descartes, Newton, and his immediate predecessors, that the 
idea of physical laws of nature is introduced. (Henry, 2004, 73-114; Garber, 2013, 46-47; 
Ruby, 1986, 357-359) From their conception, laws of nature were deeply embedded into 
a theistic worldview, being rooted within the divine will. (Ott, 2009, 1; Davies, 2010, 70-
73) Still today, some philosophers and historians think ‘law talk’ requires God in order to 
make sense1 and the confusion pertaining to what laws actually are ‘results in part from 
the fact that the idea of laws of nature has been torn loose from its original theological 
moorings.’ (Harrison, 2008, 30) The history and origin of laws of nature is complex with 
too many subtleties to adequately address here, so I will concentrate upon the 
contemporary metaphysical debate surrounding physical laws. 
Contemporary philosophy conceives the ontology of laws in three different ways: the 
strong external governing conception of laws, associated with Dretske-Tooley-
Armstrong and anti-reductionist views of Carroll and Lange; the denial view, associated 
with disposition/power theorists;2 and the reductive view, associated with ‘Hume’.3 
(Beebee, 2000, 571-594) On this account, following the traditional reading of Hume’s 
empiricist analysis of causation, there are no connections in nature and, as such, laws 
merely describe the regularities observable in the world. Nothing determines that 
something does X or Y, rather X or Y happens and the laws, in this view, simply record 
nature’s happenings. I reject this conception of laws, but due to space will only be able to 
comment briefly on my grounds for doing so. Edward Feser offers one good reason for 
rejecting the ‘Humean’ view when he writes: ‘If a law is just a regularity, then it does not 
explain anything. For what we need to know is why there are just the regularities that exist 
in nature, rather than some other regularities or no regularities at all.’ (2014, 69) Merely 
describing regularities does not provide an explanation of those regularities, which is a 
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major reason for postulating laws. Due to their empiricism, which precludes ontological 
commitment in the absence of experimental evidence for it, all the ‘Humean’ can do is 
spot regularities, not genuine connections in nature. Mumford seems correct in thinking 
this ‘Humean’ account ‘irrefutable but neither compelling, appealing nor intuitive. Being 
unappealing, in this case, should be thought to outweigh the irrefutability of the theory.’ 
(2004, 33) Our intuition that there are connections in nature, for instance that negatively 
charged particles repel other negatively charged particles, strikes against the ‘Humean’ 
view. As I endorse a richer ontology and therefore a greater ontological commitment 
than ‘Humeans’, I can explain why there are certain regularities in nature. By contrast, the 
‘Humean’ view provides us with no ontology of laws due to the limits of experimental 
evidence.  Unfortunately some of us just cannot manage to be good ‘Humeans’! 
Since I contend there are connections in nature, I must adopt a more metaphysically 
robust conception of laws. Across the literature, a particular thought experiment has 
been adopted as a way of arguing for a strong external governing conception of laws:4 
(Tooley, 1977, 667-698; Carroll, 1990, 185-219; Carroll, 1994, 77-85) ‘Consider two 
worlds, w1 and w2, each of which contains nothing but X-particles and Y-fields. In these 
worlds, as it happens, no X-particle ever enters a Y-field. Nevertheless, it might be a law 
in w1 that any X-particle entering a Y-field acquires spin-up, while in w2, any such 
particle acquires spin-down. So here we have two worlds identical in all their non-nomic 
respects differing in the laws of nature that obtain in them.’ (Ott, 2009, 248-249) If you 
can make sense of this thought experiment you will probably endorse a theory of laws 
much like the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong conception, (Armstrong, 2010, 35-47) or the 
anti-reductionism of Carroll (1994) and Lange (2000). On the Dretske-Tooley-
Armstrong view, laws are necessary connections between universals, although this 
necessity does not hold between different possible worlds. Armstrong, for instance, 
writes, ‘with the help of universals and the device of states of affairs types we have been 
able to define what we might think of as an intermediate necessity, indeterminate 
between Humean contingency and necessity. We might call this ‘nomic necessity’.’ (2010, 
41) For the anti-reductionists, the use of universals is not required. Carroll is explicit in 
this, writing: ‘we reject the answers given by Humeans and see no advantage in an appeal 
to universals. We reject all attempts to say what it is to be a law that do not appeal to 
nomic concepts.’ (2004, 5) What is key to both of these approaches is that laws involve 
some type of nomic connections, but these connections need not be the same in all 
possible worlds. An example will help illustrate this. When I put some water in a pan on 
the stove, the water boils when it reaches 100°c. We might say that ‘water’, seen as a 
universal or particular, is linked up with ‘boils at 100°c’, which may also be seen as a 
universal or particular. In this world, it is necessary that under normal conditions water 
will boil at 100°C. Nevertheless, it is a contingent fact that ‘water’ is linked with ‘boils at 
100°C’. It could have been the case that ‘water’ was linked with ‘boils at 112°C’ or ‘boils 
at 58°C’. Different possible worlds will have different boiling points for water, not 
necessarily because the normal conditions are different but because the nomic link is 
different. A theist might understand this view as follows: God creates passive objects, 
either as universals or tropes, and then decides which nomic links should govern them. It 
might have been the case that in another world God decides to create the same objects, 
but sets up the nomic connections differently. On this account, there is nothing stopping 
him from doing so. It seems to me that we might think of this type of creation as a two-
stage process, first objects and then nomic connections, or perhaps nomic connections 
and then objects. However, according to this explanation, it cannot be the case that a 
nomic connection arises with the very creation of an object, since this would require that 
these objects have the same nomic connections in every possible world. As we have seen, 
according to this explanation they may not have. By way of illustration, another example 
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might be that in this world God creates negatively charged electrons, which repel other 
electrons by virtue of their negative charge. But it could have been the case that God 
created negatively charged electrons that attracted one another by virtue of their negative 
charge. Laws, on this conception, may be thought of as external to the objects they 
govern. This does not mean that the laws are in any sense outside the world, and does 
not require that they be connections of a platonic type. Rather, what I mean by this is 
that there is no essential nomic connection between being an object of a certain type and 
the law that object obeys. The connection between the law obeyed and the object is an 
external one, not one intrinsic or internal to the nature of the object.  
I find this conception deeply problematic, and want to suggest instead that the lesson to 
be learnt from this thought experiment is that laws cannot be external to the objects they 
govern. Take, for example, the property possessed by an electron, namely negative 
charge. We might ask what is it that makes this property what it is? What are its 
constitutive identity criteria? It seems to me, following Shoemaker (1980), the best 
candidate is the causal role that a given property possesses. If we take away the causal 
role of a property, such as the role negative charge plays in repelling other negatively 
charged objects, it seems we actually attain a new property. What would it mean to say 
that in another world the ‘negative charge’ of an electron might cause attraction, rather 
than repulsion, with another negatively charged electron? If properties are what they are 
due to their causal roles, then no property can have a different causal role in other worlds. 
Mumford thinks likewise, asking, ‘if the causal role of a property is altered, are we still 
talking of the same property?’ (2004, 104) If this view of properties is correct then the 
external view of laws appears deeply problematic. Part of what it is to be negatively 
charged is to repel other negatively charged objects and this comprises an essential aspect 
of negative charge. This view, that properties cannot change causal roles in other possible 
worlds, seemingly commits one to a ‘property-essentialism’, where the causal role of 
properties is essential to properties themselves.  
It might be objected that one can imagine a negatively charged particle attracting another 
negatively charged particle in different world. My response would be, you might be able 
to imagine it, but you certainly cannot conceive of it. It might be that in our imagination 
we can conjure up an image of a particle attracting another and call it negative charge 
attracting negative charge. But this is certainly not the same as conceiving negative charge 
attracting negative charge. If what provides a property’s identity is its causal role, then 
negative charge’s identity is essentially linked with its repelling other entities with negative 
charge. This is somewhat similar to a quadrilateral having four sides. It would not make 
sense to say that one could conceive of a quadrilateral having three sides, since by 
definition part of what it is to be a quadrilateral is to have four sides. Likewise, if a 
property’s identity is essentially linked to its causal role then it does not make sense to 
think the causal role could be different and that the identity of the property should 
remain the same. Suppose, however, that the causal role is not taken to be the identity 
criteria of properties. What then is? The rival view is that there is something primitive 
that gives a property its identity, namely a quiddity. This means the property could do 
many different types of things, and yet continue to be the same property. In fact as 
Chakravartty notes, ‘any nomic profile at all is compatible with the identity of a given 
property … there is a possible world in which it has any causal profile one might 
imagine’. (forthcoming) This is no doubt a strange situation, where negative charge can 
cause the smell of chocolate, but this may nevertheless appeal to some philosophers. But 
as scientists this ‘adoption of quiddities seems a bizarre way to make sense of our 
ordinary talk of properties, let alone property talk in the scientific domain.’ (Chakravartty, 
forthcoming) The lesson I take is that we should adopt causal role as central to the 
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identity of a property and remember to distinguish between imagination and conception. 
What a property can in fact do across all possible worlds is far more restricted than our 
imaginations might suggest. 
It might further be objected that even though it seems there are many properties to 
which causal role is necessary or essential to identity, there must be some properties to 
which causal role is inessential. One response would be to deny the claim that there are 
properties to which causal role is inessential and defend the claim that all properties have 
an essential causal role, an approach reflected in dispositional monism.5 Alternatively one 
could hold to a dual-aspect or identity view, according to which properties have a 
categorical nature and also an essential causal role. Finally one could opt for a property 
dualist view, according to which categorical properties and properties with an essential 
causal role, known as dispositional properties, are distinct and equally fundamental.6 If 
one were to embrace this view, categorical properties would have to be seen as causally 
inactive in order for the argument presented in this paper to remain effective, a position 
endorsed by Molnar. A categorical property like location could be seen as causally 
relevant, since operations of dispositions are location sensitive, nevertheless the property 
itself causally inert. (Molnar, 2003,162-165) What my argument cannot accept is 
properties with a contingent causal role, which each of the above potential responses 
avoids. 
What I hope to have shown is that it is more plausible to think that laws are internal to 
properties, since a property’s causal role is essential to the property itself, and therefore 
we should be sceptical of attempts to ground a property’s causal role in something 
inessential, or as I have termed it, external, to it. I do not suppose that this argument 
alone will have persuaded everyone, but I hope it will have shown that the idea of 
external governing laws is at least deeply problematic.7 Recent efforts in metaphysics 
have revived a conception of properties that have their causal role as essential, which 
additionally provides us with a more satisfactory ontology of laws. 
Dispositions 
Dispositions/powers/capacities/tendencies, were not long ago objects of scorn, with 
Mellor writing that they ‘are as shameful in many eyes as pregnant spinsters used to 
be−ideally to be explained away, or entitled by a shotgun wedding to take the name of 
some decently real categorical property.’ (1974, 157) The main reason for this apathy was 
due primarily to Molière’s virtus dormitiva objection, where he argued that dispositions 
are vacuous, providing no explanatory power. However, contemporary theorists do not 
ascribe much weight to this objection. They have shown a willingness to accept that, 
although dispositional ascriptions are not very informative, they are nevertheless not 
tautological.8 A realist view of dispositions has therefore undergone something of a 
revival and is now becoming increasingly popular both in metaphysics and philosophy of 
science. Dispositions offer a conception of property-like entities which place their causal 
role as central. Given space restrictions, I cannot offer a complete explication and 
defence of dispositions, however I will offer a few thoughts sufficient for the purpose of 
this paper.9 Perhaps the easiest way to explain what dispositions are is through examples. 
Take ‘fragility’ and ‘solubility’ as dispositions. When in the appropriate manifestation 
conditions, they are activated and manifest. Salt, for example, dissolves once it is placed 
in water, one of its appropriate manifestation conditions. However, salt’s disposition to 
dissolve is real even if it is never in the appropriate manifestation conditions and 
consequently never manifests. Dispositions, thus, point towards their manifestation and 
are real even when not manifesting. (Oderberg, 2009, 680) We might say, as C. B. Martin 
does, that dispositions are always in a ‘ready to go’ state. (2007, 55) Dispositions are also 
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causally primitive, conveying power or oomph and therefore dispositions of objects 
make objects powerful themselves and thereby exclude the need of external laws to make 
objects powerful and act. One may wonder if we should think of dispositions as 
relational or not. This is an issue debated within the dispositionalist family, some holding 
that they should be seen as relational (Bird, 2007, 139) and others holding that they 
should not (Chakravartty, 2013). For the purpose of this paper, one need not have 
decided where one stands on this issue. Finally, we might say that a disposition has a type 
of physical/conditional necessity, rather than an unqualified necessity. (Hüttemann, 2013, 
121-122; Marmodoro, forthcoming) This means that once the manifestation conditions 
are present, with no impediments, a manifestation necessarily occurs. Charlotte Witt 
(2008, 132-133) contends Aristotle held to this type of necessity, with Stephen Brock 
(2002, 229-232) arguing Aquinas also thought this way.  
However Mumford, one of the leading dispositionalists, has suggested that Aquinas held 
to some type of dispositional modality (2013, 19; Mumford & Anjum, 2014, 108), an 
irreducible modality between full necessity and contingency which he himself advocates 
(Mumford and Anjum, 2011, 175-194), attributing this to Geach’s explication of Aquinas. 
(Anscombe & Geach, 1961, 101-104) This I think is a mistaken interpretation.10 Aquinas 
distinguishes necessity in a number of ways, including a distinction between absolute and 
conditional necessity. (Summa Contra Gentiles II, 30; Questiones Disputatae de Veritate, q.17, 
a.3; Commentary on the Metaphysics, Bk V, Lesson 6, 832-83511; De Principiis Naturae, 26) For 
Aquinas, absolute necessity can attain in different ways. Aquinas says that the absolute 
necessity of death comes from the matter of things, since all material things are made up 
of contrary elements and so it is absolutely necessary that they will corrupt or cease. 
(Bobik, 1998, 69-71) Another mode of absolute necessity, which he also calls natural 
necessity, may arise out of the very nature of a thing. (Pasnau, 2002, 232) Aquinas would 
say that it is absolutely/naturally necessary that negative charge repels negative charge 
since it is the nature of negative charge to do that. Conditional necessity, however, is 
different since it can be hindered, perhaps due to an extrinsic impediment, ‘for if fire is 
hot, it is necessary that it have the power to heat, although it is not necessary that it heat, 
since it may be hindered by something extrinsic.’ (Summa Contra Gentiles II, 30) For 
Aquinas there are three conditions, any of which being met, will restrict the cause from 
producing its effect. First, where an external impediment frustrates the effect; secondly, if 
the agent is unable, due to lack of power, to cause it; and thirdly, if the matter of the 
patient is not disposed to receive the effect.12 (Commentary on the Metaphysics, Bk V, Lesson 
6; Summa Contra Gentiles III, 74) If none of these conditions are met, the cause will follow 
of necessity, which is what conditional necessity claims. We can therefore follow Brock 
in saying that ‘Nowhere in his treatment does Thomas propose anything like a cause that 
might fail even without an impediment.’ (Brock, 2002, 229), which seems to be what 
dispositional modality allows. Aquinas himself seems to make this point, writing ‘Not 
every cause produces its effect of necessity even if it is a sufficient cause, inasmuch as the 
cause can sometimes be impeded from attaining its effect, as for instance natural causes, 
which do not produce their effects necessarily, but only for the most part, since they are 
impeded’. (De Malo, q.6, ad.15; ad.21; Commentary on the Physics II, 13, 257; Summa 
Theologica I-II, q.75, a.1, ad.2) It may be the case that we never know if any of the three 
conditions above are satisfied. Yet for Aquinas, if none of these conditions are met, the 
effect will happen of necessity. Therefore, although Aquinas does not speak much of 
conditional necessity with respect to unconscious material objects, he nevertheless 
reveals enough to show that he endorses it.13 Thomists have developed his thought in 
this way, providing further support that he would have adopted this position. Catejan, 
for instance makes explicit what I think is implicit in Aquinas writing, saying: ‘an 
irrational active potency necessarily operates when a subject is present and impediments 
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are withdrawn; for heat necessarily heats when a subject that can be heated is present, 
and nothing impedes it.’ (Continuation to Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's on 
Interpretation, II, XI, 4) More examples could be given,14 but I think this provides 
sufficient grounds  to suggest that the Mumford reading, based on Geach, is mistaken 
and that Aquinas would have more likely held to conditional necessity, as Brock has 
argued. 
If one assumes this conception of dispositions can be held, then laws can be thought of 
as dependent on properties.15 When God creates the world, he creates particular objects 
which have properties that are disposed to behave in certain ways when met by 
appropriate manifestation conditions. Properties themselves are powerful. God no longer 
needs to create laws to govern the actions of properties and objects. Rather, properties 
and objects are active themselves and do what they do in virtue of what they are. On this 
view, the truth-makers of laws are ‘the essential irreducible powers of the objects of that 
world.’ (Molnar, 2003, 162) Laws are abstractions of what powerful properties normally 
do in particular situations. In this respect, the notion of ‘laws of nature’ may be unhelpful. 
Martin writes, ‘If you accept arguments for a realism of dispositions and their reciprocal 
disposition partners and grant that dispositions could be fully actual although their 
partnerings or manifestings might not be, then what is the need for universal laws? Again, 
laws appear to be ontologically otiose.’ (2007, 22) Walter Ott concurs suggesting, ‘all talk 
of ‘laws of nature’ is a dispensable convenience.’ (2009, 250) Whilst Mumford concludes, 
if we had recognised ‘that properties were already modal, and the particulars that 
instantiated them were thereby already powerful, we need never have posited laws in the 
hope of them doing work that was already being done.’ (2004, 196) 
However, it may be objected that recent work in quantum mechanics has led to the view 
that we should see relations, or laws, as fundamental, rather than objects with 
dispositions. This is the view of ontic-structuralists, held by French, (2014) Ladyman, and 
Ross, (2007) where a radical departure from the usual way of thinking is needed. 
Ladyman and Ross set out their position writing, ‘the identity and individuality of objects 
depends on the relational structure of the world. Hence, a first approximation to our 
metaphysics is: ‘There are no things. Structure is all there is.’’ (Ladyman & Ross, 2007, 
130) They continue noting, ‘we shall argue that in the light of contemporary physics … 
talk of unknowable intrinsic natures and individuals is idle and has no justified place in 
metaphysics.’ (2007, 131) The claim is that physics has shown us that relations, structures 
or laws (understood in this way) are fundamental, and therefore all talk of dispositions is 
just old fashioned and wrong! Thankfully, things are not quite that simple. Ontic-
structuralism has had numerous critics, but more importantly, there have been many 
philosophers of science who have interpreted the results of quantum mechanics in a 
dispositionalist manner.16 It is ironic that structuralists have argued that one should adopt 
their view due to science, since dispositionalists have done likewise.17 I happen to think 
that science can justify more than one metaphysical account of the world and therefore 
follow Chakravartty in thinking that ‘by itself, scientific practice does not yield any 
ontology at all unless one is willing to adopt some philosophical lenses through which to 
interpret its outputs.’ (forthcoming) The latest results of science should not be seen to 
threaten dispositionalism, although some metaphysical interpretations of the science 
might. 
As mentioned previously, the early-modern conception of physical laws was directly 
related to the will of God, and many today have argued that laws still require a 
recognition of God to make sense of them. Nevertheless, I am suggesting that some 
contemporary understandings of laws have moved us back towards the conception of 
nature’s regularity held by both Aristotle and Aquinas. Why would a theist accept this 
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internalist view and reject the modern externalist one, especially when Lydia Jaeger 
(2010) has suggested that Nancy Cartwright (1999), who endorses a similar view to the 
one I have advocated, takes this position partly due to her atheistic outlook?18 What 
reasons, then, might a theist have for accepting this view? Some suggest thinking about 
dispositions in the Aristotelian and Thomistic categories of act and potency, (Feser, 2014, 
47-87; Oderberg, 2007, 131-143; Oderberg, 2009, 677-684) which might subsequently 
allow us to reconstruct a version of Aquinas’s first way.19 Further, Steven Horst has 
recently shown how this conception of laws might furnish an improved analysis of 
miracles. (2014, 338-344) Whilst I think both these suggestions commendable, I wish to 
focus on two other aspects of this dispositional conception of laws, which should 
provide reasons for theists to adopt such a view. 
Occasionalism and Concurrentism  
One reason a theist might adopt a dispositionalist view of laws is that it seems to imply 
concurrentism rather than occasionalism. I follow Alfred Freddoso in defining the three 
main theories of divine conservation, how God sustains all of creation, as follows: 
‘According to mere conservationism, God contributes to the ordinary course of nature 
solely by creating and conserving natural substances along with their active and passive 
causal powers or capacities.’ (1994, 134) Occasionalism, according to the version which 
Freddoso has argued is the only form worth defending, holds that ‘God alone brings 
about effects in nature; natural substances, contrary to common opinion, make no 
genuine causal contribution at all to any such effect’ (1994, 132-133), and there are no 
essences or causal powers in the material world.20 Concurrentism ‘occupies a middle 
ground between what its advocates perceive as the unseemly extremes of occasionalism 
and mere conservationism. According to concurrentism, a natural effect is produced 
immediately by both God and created substances, so that, contrary to occasionalism, 
secondary agents make a genuine causal contribution to the effect and in some sense 
determine its specific character by virtue of their own internal properties, whereas, 
contrary to mere conservationism, they do so only if God cooperates with them 
contemporaneously as an immediate cause in a certain “general” way’. (Freddoso, 1994, 
134) 
Discussions of divine conservation have been uncommon in contemporary philosophy 
of religion, with Freddoso, (1994, 134) McCann and Kvanvig (1991, 587) suggesting that 
mere conservationism is often taken for granted. Nevertheless as Freddoso notes, 
‘almost all the important figures in the history of philosophical theology have rejected it 
as philosophically deficient and theologically “unsafe”. According to Albert the Great, 
writing in the thirteenth century, the opinion that secondary causes are sufficient by 
themselves to produce at least some effects without God’s direct causal influence “has all 
but disappeared from the lecture hall and is regarded as heretical by many moderns”.’ 
(1991, 555) This is clearly not the case today, but below I will suggest a reason for theists 
to reject mere conservationism, even though it is consistent with dispositionalism. 
An example might be useful to clarify what these theories amount to and to highlight 
their differences. The book of Daniel, chapters 1-3, tells the story of Shadrach, Meshach 
and Abednego. In chapter 3, King Nebuchadnezzar orders the three men to be thrown 
into a furnace where a miracle occurs. ‘The fire had not had any power over the bodies 
of those men; the hair of their heads was not singed, their tunics were not harmed, and 
not even the smell of fire came from them.’ (Daniel 3:27 NRSV). According to the three 
conceptions, God acted differently to protect these men. Mere conservationism holds 
that God merely conserves objects in being and all power comes from objects 
themselves. God on this view cannot over-ride or remove his concurrence from objects, 
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rather He merely sustains things in doing what they naturally do. This view therefore 
leads to a problem within the story, since if God had preserved the natures of each of the 
objects and allowed their powers to work as normal, the men’s flesh would surely have 
burned. Instead, God must have either changed the nature of the fire – but then it was 
not fire at all; changed the nature of flesh – leading us to ask if they were real men; or 
placed a protective barrier over these men. One might find the supposition that a 
protective barrier could be placed around the men more than adequate, and indeed this 
would seem to be adequate in protecting the men. However, if one wants to hold that 
God is absolutely sovereign over nature, the idea that he might only be able to produce a 
miracle in this way shows a distinct inability to exercise sovereignty over the natural 
world. Molina, for instance, writes:  
‘If God did not cooperate with secondary causes, He clearly would not have been 
able to bring it about that the Babylonian fire did not burn the three young men 
except by opposing it, as it were, and impeding its action either (i) through some 
contrary action or (ii) by placing something around the young men or conferring 
on them some resistant quality which would prevent the fire's impressing its 
action upon them. Therefore, since this derogates both the divine power and also 
the total subjection by which all things submit to and obey that power, one 
should claim without doubt that God cooperates with secondary causes, and that 
it was only because God did not concur with the fire in its action that the young 
men were not incinerated by it.’  (Concordia, pt. II, disp. 25, § 15, quoted in 
Fredosso, 1991, 574) 
Since mere conservationism has difficulties in accounting for miracles, particularly 
miracles of omission, and since many, such as Molina, want to say God has the ability to 
perform these types of miracles, miracles contra naturam, (Aquinas, De Potentia, Q6, A2, 
ad.3) God’s sovereignty according to mere conservationism is radically diminished and 
therefore theists should not embrace it.21  
Occasionalism holds that there are no necessary connections in nature, it embraces anti-
essentialism, and considers that no created object has powers, rather God possess all 
power. Fire does not burn flesh since there is no actual connection between fire burning 
and flesh melting. There is a connection only in the sense that this is what God has 
regularly used fire for, but God does not have to act as he normally does, and in this 
instance he chooses not to. God could just as easily have connected the fire with the 
feeling of a nice cool breeze when the men were in the furnace, since fire and flesh have 
no intrinsic nature on this view. On the concurrentist view the fire does have a nature, as 
does flesh, and fire and flesh also have causal powers. Nevertheless, this is not the total 
cause of each event, rather, God has to concur with these causes in order for the burning 
of flesh to take place. For some concurrentists, for example Suárez, all God does is 
remove his concurrence from the secondary causes of nature, which by itself is not 
sufficient to burn the men. (Disputationes Metaphsicae. 22, sect. I, 11; Freddoso, 1991, 573-
574; Ott, 2008, 171; Ott, 2009, 23) Aquinas, however, seems to think God cannot 
remove his concurrence without causing the object to cease existing, and thus God must 
either provide power which by itself nature is unable to, or act against nature by acting 
contrary to the natural dispositions of objects. (Adams, 2013, 12-13; Silva, 2013a, 658-
667; Silva, 2014, 277-291) 
Why would anyone hold to occasionalism? The main reason seems to be to give more 
power to God, and magnify his omnipotence. (McCracken, 1983, 211) The ‘creators’ of 
the notion of laws of nature thought of the world as passive and inert with laws being the 
actors and all power of laws found in God, seemingly leading to occasionalism. 
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Nevertheless, occasionalism has always had its critics and problems. Michael Dodds 
writes, ‘Aquinas has two words for occasionalism: “stupid” and “impossible”.’ (2012, 
211) One problematic element of occasionalism is that it removes the creator-creature 
distinction by making all causation univocal. God on this view causes as we cause and 
does not ‘transcend the categories of secondary causality, but would have to belong to 
one of them.’ (Dodds, 2012, 211) Another problem for occasionalists is how to deal with 
the problem of evil, since concurrentists ‘can argue with some plausibility that the 
defectiveness of evil states of affairs (whether they be moral evils or physical evils) is 
traceable solely to the causal contribution of the secondary or creaturely causes.’ 
(Freddoso, 1988, 115-116) Occasionalists, however, hold that God is the sole cause of 
everything in nature, which therefore makes him the sole cause of evil. I wish to focus, 
however, on a different problem, analogous to the problem I alluded to earlier regarding 
laws. 
Eleventh century Muslim philosopher and occasionalist, Al-Ghazali, allowed that two 
pieces of cotton could be exposed to exactly the same conditions, such as fire, and yet 
the outcomes be different, with one burning to ashes and the other not.22 (The Incoherence 
of the Philosophers, 166-177) A concurrentist could agree with this, in so far as God 
removes his concurrence from one of the flames acting on the pieces of cotton and not 
the other, or by his acting against the natural disposition of one of the flames, but he 
could not agree that if God’s concurrence were involved in both circumstances, two 
different things would occur. An occasionalist, however, has no problem with this result; 
since cotton and fire have no natures, God can make one piece of cotton burn and the 
other not. But a critic of occasionalism can ask: if cotton has no nature, then what is it 
that makes cotton cotton? Is it how it looks, the effect it has, how it feels? But in each of 
these cases cotton owes how it looks, its effects and feeling to causal properties with 
essential natures. The occasionalist seems to have to allow that, since nothing has any 
nature, anything could be cotton. The problem with occasionalism, then, is that we do 
not know what it is that does something, since something could do anything, although in 
the strict sense God does everything. This anti-essentialism, regarding natural properties, 
renders the position unintelligible. As Katherin Rogers writes, ‘what is it to be something 
with no causal power at all? Could such an object have properties? Can an object exist 
without properties? It is impossible, I take it, to conceptualize an object which can 
neither affect nor be affected by any other created thing in any way at all.’ (2001, 359) 
The problem with removing power from nature is the view of the world that results. 
Properties and objects appear dead and passive, there is nothing that they do, nothing 
they are essentially connected to, but this results in a world difficult to make sense of.23 
As Peter Harrison writes, ‘part of the reason for the rise of occasionalist understandings 
of causation at this time [the seventeenth century] is that they meshed neatly with atomic 
or corpuscular matter theory.’ (2008, 23) The adoption of atomism removed powers 
from nature resulting in atoms or corpuscles being understood as passive. Breaking 
inherent internal connections in nature, where natural power resided, meant that power 
must now be placed elsewhere. God was therefore seen to provide all power to natural 
objects, and thus occasionalism naturally followed.24 Whereas before connections were 
internal to a thing’s nature, now they were loose and separate due to the new atomic 
philosophy. Therefore the connections were removed and placed elsewhere, namely in 
God. Modern proponents of occasionalism are aware of the problem as to where causal 
power comes from. This awareness can be seen in William Vallicella’s defence, where he 
employs a Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong view of laws with an added ‘‘vertical’ 
supplementation’ (1996, 358-359) of causal-oomph from God. Ott likewise writes of 
Descartes and Malebrache, that ‘neither of them suggests that the laws might operate “on 
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their own,” an alternative regarded on all hands as absurd.’ (2009, 248) Even external 
laws need power, which God duly supplies. If one removes God from this picture, which 
is what happened later on in the eighteenth century, then laws must contain power 
themselves, with the power being primitive and unexplainable. What seems to me to be 
clear is that the introduction of laws and the removal of power in nature led as a matter 
of course to occasionalism in the seventeeth century, as it could today. It may be the case 
that laws can be thought of as having some type of created power, which avoids 
occasionalism, yet I find the reintroduction of dispositionalism more congenial in 
avoiding occasionalism, and with less strange conclusions.25  
Dispositionalism, thus, leads the theist towards mere conservationism or concurrentism, 
whilst ruling out occasionalism. As I pointed out earlier, there are grounds for ruling out 
mere conservationism, if one accepts miracles and does not accept a limitation on God’s 
sovereignty. Therefore, I argue that theists who wish to embrace dispositionalism should 
be concurrentists regarding divine conservation. Dispositionalism argues that properties 
have essential connections in nature, manifestations which they point to, and therefore 
there is nothing external to them which make them powerful. The objection that this 
account limits God’s power is debatable, as one might argue that ‘a created world with 
genuine secondary causation … rather displays it [God’s power] more fully than would a 
universe of impotent beings. God is not a niggardly sovereign jealously guarding the 
prerogatives of causal power, but rather a generous Creator who graciously bestows the 
gift of action along with the gift of being.’ (Shanley, 1998, 102; Aquinas, Summa Contra 
Gentiles III, 69) Further, God does not compete with secondary causes in nature, but 
rather they are of different orders, operating on ‘different ontological levels such that 
there is no question of them “interfering” with each other.’ (Rodgers, 2000, 117; Rodgers, 
2001, 350; Ott, 2009, 170; Shanley, 1998, 103, 108) 
Dispositionalism regarding laws draws us back to a concurrentist understanding of the 
God-nature relation, emphasising nature’s connections and powers, whilst rejecting the 
problematic view of occasionalism. 
Internal and External Teleology 
There is a second reason theists might wish to adopt a dispositionalist view of laws, 
namely that it revives a teleological conception of nature. It is commonly thought that 
there is one type of teleology: design imposed externally. Many therefore think that 
nature itself has no design. Nevertheless, historically there has been another type of 
teleology that considers design internal to each object. (Feser, 2010, 142-159) Aquinas 
argued that ‘every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more than 
another from the action of the agent, unless it were by chance.’ (Summa Theologica I, q.44, 
a.4.; Summa Theologica I-II, q.1, a.2; Summa Contra Gentiles III, 2.) The dispositionalist 
account of laws revives this distinction. 
Early Modern philosophy conceived of nature as a giant artefact, such as a complex and 
intricate clock. (Lehoux, 2006, 528; Harrison, 2008, 16-18, 20; Plantinga, 2011, 77) 
Teleology therefore came to be based on artefacts, as is clear from William Paley’s 
teleological argument from complexity. (Natural Theology, Ch1) The complex arrangement 
of a thing revealed design, with the regularity of a thing explained by laws. However, in 
previous centuries teleology was linked to regularity, or what things usually do. Artefacts 
were thought of as using the natural directionality in substances for mans own purpose. 
Why an object continued to act consistently toward the same end was thought to need a 
teleological explanation. Conceiving of nature as a machine introduced passivity into 
nature and imagined God as a divine artificer creating a highly complex world machine, 
12 
 
imposing teleology which was not internal to objects themselves. Jaeger notes ‘Kepler 
wrote (to Herward von Hohenberg, February 10, 1605), the movement of the celestial 
bodies is to be conceived “not on the model of a divine, animate being, but on the model 
of a clock” (Harrison 2008, 20) … A created cosmos is as a whole an artefact, produced 
by God.’ (2012, 456) If someone asked, when conceiving of nature as a machine, why X 
always did Y, the explanation would have to be given in terms of laws that were not 
internal to the objects themselves. That is, God ordered it in such a way. But if one 
conceived of nature as Aristotle or Aquinas did, this would be the wrong way to think of 
nature. Things act as they do since they have internal directionality due to being the type 
of thing they are. Nothing other than an explanation of what the object is needs to be 
provided, it does what it does because that is what it is. Removing internal directionality 
resulted in something outside the object itself being posited to explain why X did Y or Z, 
resulting in the ascription of passivity to nature. Nevertheless, as already noted, passivity 
and externality are aspects of nature dispositionalists deny. 
A disposition is something that is directed toward its manifestation, it is ‘characterized by 
its ‘esse-ad’ or ‘being-toward’, its directedness toward non-actual states of affairs.’ (Ott, 
2009, 167) This towardness or directedness reintroduces the distinction between external 
and internal teleology. Modern dispositionalist theories seemingly have revived an aspect 
of what Aquinas would have called a ‘final cause’. George Molnar thinks dispositions 
have a ‘physical intentionality’ (2003, 60-81), John Heil terms it a ‘natural intentionality’ 
(2003, 221; 2006, 250), Martin (2007, 178) and David Armstrong (1999, 35) concur that 
dispositions exhibit intentionality, with E J Lowe (2009, 150) arguing it is a type of 
normativity. John Lamont’s view aligns with my analysis. He writes that ‘recent defences 
of physical intentionality, however, could be seen as advancing a view at least analogous 
to Aristotle’s postulation of final causes in things’ (2007, 880-881; Ott, 2009, 11 n.27, 30; 
Oderberg, 2008; Feser, 2009, 50) with Feser showing that final causation is a more 
suitable description than contemporary notions of intentionality. (2014, 88-105; 
Oderberg, forthcoming) The main reason being that some aspects of mental 
intentionality, such as a disposition having an indeterminate object or exhibiting 
referential opacity, are non-transferable onto the physical world. (Bird, 2007, 118-126) 
Some may worry that final-causation means there must be a God guiding everything, and 
indeed this is how the Thomist sees things. Nevertheless, what I mean by final causation 
is what we might think of as the lowest or most basic level of final causation, which 
Aquinas gives to us as meaning that, ‘every agent, of necessity, acts for an end.’ (Summa 
Theologica I-II, q.1, a.2; Summa Theologica I, q.44, a.4; Summa Contra Gentiles III, 2.) He 
adopts this view in order to make sense of efficient causation. If the cause X did not act 
in order to achieve the end Y, why does it always achieve Y and not A, B, C or D? 
Accepting this level of final causality obviously leaves open the question as to what the 
source of that finality is. It should also be noted that not everything has an end, only an 
agent, or something acting as an efficient cause. There may well be byproducts in 
achieving this end that do not act for any end, but this need not trouble us nor Aquinas. 
We might take this finality as irreducible and not requiring of a divine mind, as Aristotle 
did, and since all I am trying to establish here is that there is an irreducible teleology that 
is internal to things, or in our case properties, this is all I require.26 One can accept there 
is an irreducible teleology which is internal to things, whilst not committing to this 
directionality’s source. This is a further step, and certainly one Aquinas takes, and 
perhaps one we might also wish to take. Nevertheless, all I am trying to achieve here is 
reviving this distinction, which may prove fruitful for the theist. 
Why might a theist be interested in reviving the external/internal teleology distinction? 
Due to a lack of space, I can only gesture toward areas where further work might be 
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undertaken to see if these insights are fruitful. One reason could be to reformulate a 
Thomistic teleological argument, the fifth way, which relies on final causality rather than 
complexity.27 Another might be to argue that nature, and evolution, is internally 
teleological.28 This suggestion would appear to be welcomed by some evolutionists such 
as James Shapiro, who writes ‘despite widespread philosophical prejudices, cells are now 
reasonably seen to operate teleologically: their goals are survival, growth, and 
reproduction.’ (2011, 137) Similarly Denis Walsh writes, ‘The understanding of how 
evolution can be adaptive requires us to incorporate teleology—issuing from the goal-
directed, adaptive plasticity of organisms—as a legitimate scientific form of explanation. 
The natural sciences must, once again, learn to live with teleology.’ (2008, p.133) Internal 
teleology may also provide the theist with the resources to defend a classical view of 
natural law ethics.29 Lisska writes, ‘An act is morally wrong … because the act prevents 
the completion—the self-actualization, as it were—of the dispositional properties which 
determine the content of human nature.’ (1996, 104) If directionality is built into nature, 
as I have suggested, then nature is not value free but is value laden, ‘there is no way of 
describing the world accurately that omits natural normative teleology.’ (Oderberg, 2010b, 
65) 
Armstrong has proposed an objection to this type of account, namely that it implies 
Meinongianism, the view that there are subjects of true predication that have no being.30 
He writes, ‘it seems to smack of a Meinongian relation to the non-existent – in this case a 
relation to the manifestation that does not occur.’ (2002, 168; 1999, 35) Indeed this 
relation to something non-existent has often been seen as a problem with final causality, 
or internal teleology, for how can the existent relate to something non-existent?31 Making 
use of the Aristotelian notion of formal causality,32 it seems to me the theist has a simple 
response, namely to argue that the ends of each object do exist formally within the 
intellect of God, who directs all objects toward their ends. (Feser, 2013, 733-735) 
Thus, it seems possible to revive internal teleology within a dispositionalist ontology, 
where the final causes/physical-intentionality/natural-intentionality of objects/properties 
provide the truth-makers of law statements, with laws being thought of as a façon de 
parler, rather than something of ontological significance. As Mariano Artigas writes, 
‘because the laws of physics indicate the existence of directionality in nature the new 
science contained teleological features.’ (2001, 138) Hoffman agrees, writing, ‘the sort of 
tendency expressed by such laws has the implication that C is aimed at E, and that is 
sufficient to give the laws a teleological character.’ (2009, 308) If my earlier argument was 
correct, then it is the internal nature of properties, or dispositions, which conveys this 
teleological direction, with laws being thought of as merely a description of what these 
properties usually do. 
Necessity in Nature 
Some will find necessity in nature an unpalatable consequence of the conception of laws 
I am proposing, but I shall suggest it is not problematic. The necessity I am concerned 
with here is that the laws of nature will be the same in all possible worlds if all the 
properties are the same. This will not have adverse effects on concurrentists or their 
acceptance of miracles, since God can still remove his concurrence on particular 
occasions, or provide power that nature is unable to supply. What God cannot do is 
change the nature of properties so that in one world property X has causal role Y, and in 
another world the same property X has causal role Z. It is this sense of laws being 
necessary that I am concerned with. Oderberg explains this, writing, ‘laws of nature are 
truths about how objects must behave. How objects must behave depends wholly on 
how objects must be. Hence the laws depend wholly on how objects must be. Hence 
14 
 
they obtain in every world in which the objects they are about exist. In other words, 
every world in which certain objects exist will be a world in which those objects must 
behave in a certain way. … There is no world, then, in which the objects exist and the 
laws about them do not obtain. So the necessity of those laws is metaphysical, since it is a 
necessity derived from the essences of the objects.’ (2007, 144) This will not sit well with 
some theists, as it appears to limit God’s omnipotence. Jaeger, for instance, writes, ‘for 
Judaeo-Christian theism, the world, with its order, is grounded in God’s will; it takes its 
origin from a free act. Thus it might not exist, or it could be different from what it is. 
The world, and by consequence natural order, is thus contingent and not necessary.’ 
(2010, 1613) Read one way, Jaeger would not welcome my conclusion that physical laws 
are necessary, since she might wish to allow that God could make fire cause a cool breeze 
rather than heat. However, taken more charitably, my view can agree with Jaeger’s 
statement. 
As mentioned earlier, on an external view of laws God creates in a two-step process. 
First he creates objects, and then he creates laws to govern objects. On the 
dispositionalist account, however, God creates in one step, since dispositions determine 
what objects do. (Heil, 2003, 93) This account can agree with Jaeger that order is 
grounded in God’s will, since what exists depends on what dispositions God has 
actualised. Additionally, this view holds that God is free to create or refrain from creating. 
The world’s order is still contingent, in the sense that God could have created other 
objects and other dispositions, but is not contingent in the sense that God could have 
created the same property to do different things in different worlds. (Heil, 2012, 118; 
Molnar, 2003, 163-164) If God had done this, he would have merely created two 
different properties. This does not seem to limit God’s omnipotence, since it is 
contradictory to suppose that God could make negative charge repel negative charge in 
one world, whilst attract negative charge in another. Unless the theist wishes to embrace 
the extremely unpopular thesis that God can do the contradictory then she should have 
no problem with the view I am commending. I can therefore fully agree with Alvin 
Plantinga when he writes, ‘it is not necessary, not part of the divine nature, to institute or 
promulgate just these laws’ (2011, 281), whilst also maintain that if God creates the objects 
and dispositions of this world in another world, the laws of nature must be the same. 
The necessity of laws then, does not seem problematic for the theist. 
Conclusion 
The question, what laws of nature are, had not been thought about to a significant extent 
until recently. I have suggested in this paper that a dispositionalist, internalist account of 
physical laws is the most metaphysically compelling, whilst theists have further 
theological reasons to adopt this account. As I have sought to show, this account leads 
the theist towards concurrentism regarding the God-world relation in terms of causation. 
Moreover, it revives the distinction between internal and external teleology, and embeds 
the whole world with directionality. Finally, one need not be concerned that laws turn 
out necessary on this account, since it seems logically contradictory that they turn out 
otherwise, given the properties and natures in this world. God, though, is still free to 
create any nature he chooses, since ‘the laws of nature are the laws of natures’ (Oderberg, 
2007, 144), and thereby instantiate any law. This paper has sought to show many things, 
and therefore it is no doubt the case that further argument and investigation is necessary. 
However I hope to have shown that a dispositionalist Deity is an option theists should 
strongly consider. More work needs to be done, and no doubt further implications will 
be uncovered. With historical defenders of this view, such as Aquinas and Suárez, and 
the metaphysics behind it becoming increasingly popular, theists must have some 
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powerful defeaters in order not to embrace this conception of God and laws. The old 
might once again become the new. 
 
Notes 
1. For further discussion of this see: (Harrison, 2013, 137; Garber, 2013, 66; Jaeger, 
2012, 461; Cartwright, 1993, 299) 
2. It is difficult to classify this view adequately since there are a number of positions 
within it. Ellis (2001) seems to take it that laws are reduced to dispositions, Bird (2007, 
202) and Molnar (2003, 199) take it that laws supervene on dispositions, and Mumford 
(2004) takes it that dispositions eliminate the need for laws altogether. What is clear is 
that dispositions play a primary role and laws are in some sense dependent on them. 
3. Here I am taking Hume on the traditional reading, and do not wish to enter into 
debates as to whether this reading is correct. 
4. For further discussion of these though experiments see: (Beebee, 2000, 571-594; 
Loewer, 1996, 101-127; Ott, 2009, 248-249) 
5. In the literature different terms have been used for dispositional properties and 
categorical properties. Dispositions have been called, powers, capacities and potencies 
with categorical properties called occurrent, qualities, actualities. Whether these terms are 
synonymous with one another is not for this paper to discuss, but the variation in 
terminology can cause some confusion. 
6. (Mumford, 2004; Bird, 2007) hold to dispositional monism, (Martin & Heil, 1999; 
Heil, 2012; Martin, 2008) hold to a dual-aspect or identity view, and (Ellis, 2001; Molnar, 
2003) opt for a dualist view. 
7. For further criticism of and external governing conception of laws see: 
(Mumford, 2004; Bird, 2007) 
8. For further criticism of Molière see: (Feser, 2014, 43-46; Mumford, 1998, 136-
142; Martin, 1997, 189-190; Michon, 2007; Hutchison, 1991; Chakravartty, 2007, 125-
126) 
9. Much work has recently been done on a realist theory of dispositions/powers 
and for a fuller explication and defence please see: (Mumford, 1998; Molnar, 2003; 
Mumford & Anjum, 2011; Groff & Greco, 2013; Marmodoro, 2010; Bird, 2007; Jacobs, 
forthcoming) 
10. To be fair to Mumford & Anjum, they do suggest Geach’s reading of Aquinas 
might be wrong. (Mumford & Anjum, 2014, 109) 
11. Aquinas uses the term relative necessity here, rather than conditional. 
12. For further elaboration of these three conditions see: (Silva, 2013b, 641-648) 
13. For further work on this issue from people who seem to agree with my 
assessment see: (Smith, 1958, 241; Rosental, 2011, 35-39; Macdonald, 1993, 176-177; 
Makin, 1989, 253-274; Brock, 2006, 296-297) 
14. Some examples who endorse conditional necessity: (Harper, 1884, 390-394; 
Coffey, 1918, 421-422; Phillips, 1934, 164-165; Freddoso, 1986, 215-242; Wallace, 1996, 
19-22) 
15. See note 2 for the different ways one could spell this out. 
16. See for instance: (Kuhlmann, 2010; Dorato, 2006 & 2007; Dorato & Elsfeld, 
2010; Suárez, 2004 & 2007; Bigaj, 2012 & 2014) – note that Suárez calls dispositions 
propensities. 
17. For discussion of these arguments, by other dispositionalists who are not 
convinced of the arguments from science for dispositions see: (Chakravartty, 
forthcoming; Williams, 2010) 
18. I do not wish to conjecture if this is correct. 
16 
 
19. For modern defences of Aquinas’ first way see: (Feser 2013a; Feser, 2009, 62-81; 
Martin, 1997, 132-145; Oderberg, 2010a) 
20. This is argued for by a critic and accepted by a proponent of occasionalism, so 
should not be thought of as a straw man: (Freddoso, 1988, 91-99; Vallicella, 1996, 351) 
21. For further criticisms of mere conservationism see: (Freddoso, 1991, 553-585) 
22. Ockham seems to endorse something similar, as Adams notes, ‘Ockham 
acknowledges, God could have made it a rule that whenever fire comes near, God acts 
alone to produce heat in the nearby combustible. Nevertheless, Ockham refuses to take 
occasionalism seriously as a hypothesis about what really happens’. (2013, 22) 
23. For further explication of this see: (Mumford, 2013, 15; Ellis, 2002, 2-3; 
Sheldrake, 1991, 37; Artigas, 2001, 73) 
24. For more on the historical development of the laws of nature and its ties with 
atomism and occasionalism see: (Milton, 1998) A good historical example to study is that 
of Descartes. For his ideas on laws of nature see: (Henry, 2004) 
25. It might be thought that a law ontology admits a wider range of possibilities and 
so should be preferred.  However it has been argued that restricted modal options are 
not problematic (Wilson, 2012), but also that restricting modality to dispositions is not 
overly restrictive. (Vetter, forthcoming) 
26. For an interesting account of another modern construal of teleological causation 
see: (Hawthorne & Nolan, 2006) 
27. For modern defences of a Thomistic fifth way see: (Feser, 2013b, 707-749; Feser, 
2009, 110-120; Martin, 1997, 179-206) 
28. For examples of how evolution can be thought of as teleological, or how one 
could develop an argument to the effect that evolution is internally teleological see: 
(Gilson, 1984; Stove, 1995, 258-306; Davies, 1999, 121-122; Conway Morris, 2003; Walsh, 
2008; Ariew, 2007; Ayala, 2000) 
29. For further examples of how internal teleology allows a natural law theory to be, 
or at least could be developed see: (Lisska, 1996; Oderberg, 2010b; Feser, 2009, 175-180; 
Artigas, 2001, 131; Foot, 2001, 25-38; Mercier, 1917, 212-223; Pruss, 2013, 99-108) 
30. For Meinong the subject ‘neither exists (in the manner of causally active/passive 
things like electrons and mountains) nor subsists (in the manner of such causally inert 
items as propositions and numbers. The pure object has no being at all, whence it 
follows that Aussersein [(it)] is not a third mode of being alongside of existence and 
subsistence.’ (Vallicella, 2002, 38) 
31. One example of this is (Hobhouse, 1913, 314) 
32. For a modern defence of formal causality see: (Tabaczek, 2013; Dodds, 2012, 99-
102) 
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